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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to analyze the nature of the terrorist threat following 9/11, and to explore
the implications for defense R&D policy. First it reviews the defining trends of defense R&D
since the cold war, and brings in pertinent empirical evidence: The US accumulated during
the 1990s a defense R&D stock 10 times larger than any other country, and almost 30 times
larger than Russia. Big weapon systems, key during the cold war but of dubious significance
since then still figure prominently, commanding 30% of current defense R&D spending, vis
a vis just about 13% for intelligence and antiterrorism. The second part of the paper examines
the nature of the terrorist threat, focusing on the role of uncertainty, the lack of deterrence,
and the extent to which security against terrorism is (still) a public good. I develop for that
purpose a simple model of terrorism, cast in a nested discrete choice framework. Two
strategies are considered: fighting terrorism at its source, and protecting individual targets,
which entails a negative externality. Contrary to the traditional case of national defense,
security against terrorism becomes a mixed private/public good. A key result of the model is
that the government should spend enough on fighting terrorism at its source, so as to nullify
the incentives of private targets to invest in their own security. Intelligence emerges as the
key aspect of the war against terrorism and, accordingly, R&D aimed at providing advanced
technological means for intelligence is viewed as the cornerstone of defense R&D. This
entails developing computerized sensory interfaces, and increasing the ability to analyze vast
amounts of data. Both have direct civilian applications, and therefore the required R&D is
mostly "dual use". Indeed, there is already a private market for these systems, with a large
number of players. R&D programs designed to preserve this diversity and to encourage
further competition may prove beneficial both for the required R&D, and for the economy at
large.
Manuel Trajtenberg






I.  Introduction 
  The devastating terrorist attacks of 9/11 and their aftermath pose a formidable 
challenge to US national security, and call for the rethinking of established dogma in a 
wide range of fields. The attacks came after a relatively peaceful decade that constituted 
an interlude between the cold war, and the emerging terrorist threat. Defense R&D had 
proceeded over the post WWII decades along the familiar path of the arms race in the 
nuclear age, bounded only by treaties that sought to mitigated the spiraling costs and 
preserve the logic of the “mutually assured destruction” doctrine. This coincided with a 
golden era of scientific and technological progress,
1 unleashing extraordinary advances in 
military technology. The collapse of the Soviet Union, brought about in part by that same 
race, left the US as the only superpower, particularly in terms of its edge in military 
technology. However, the new terrorist threat negated much of that advantage, since the 
enemy could neither be effectively deterred by overwhelming military force, nor could it 
be destroyed by actually deploying that force. In the meantime defense R&D continued 
by and large along the old path, still devoting large amount of resources to the 
development of big, complex, offensive weapon systems that have no rival in the world, 
and for which there is no clear threat that these costly weapons could forestall. A fresh 
look at defense R&D policy is thus called for, starting from a thorough analysis of the 
new terrorist threat and seeking to trace its implications for the required R&D. The main 




  Section II characterizes in more detail defense R&D before 9/11, bringing in data 
to bear both on the total stock of military R&D of the US vis a vis other leading 
countries, and on the composition of R&D spending. Simple computations of the defense 
R&D stock generated during the 1990s indicate that the US accumulated during that 
decade alone a stock 10 times as large as that of any other country, and almost 30 times 
larger than its old foe, Russia. Within this vast technological reservoir big weapon 
systems still figure prominently, commanding about 30% of current R&D spending (not   4
including the Ballistic Missile Defense program, which commands another 15%). On the 
other hand, R&D aimed at intelligence and antiterrorism, which the analysis below places 
at the forefront of the desirable defense R&D policy, constitute only about 13% of the 
known total.  
 
  Section III examines the nature of the terrorist threat, focusing on the role of 
uncertainty, the lack of deterrence, and the extent to which providing security against 
terrorism is still a public good. This later issue receives a more detailed treatment in 
section IV where I develop a simple model of terrorism, cast in a nested discrete choice 
framework. In its context one can analyze the probability that a terrorist attack will take 
place, and the (conditional) probability that any particular target will be hit. Two 
strategies are available to combat terrorism: The first consists of fighting terrorism at its 
source, thus reducing the overall probability that an attack will take place; this constitutes 
a public good and hence is to be provided by the government. The second entails 
potential targets investing in their own security, thus reducing the probability that they 
will be hit, but raising it for others (a negative externality). Contrary to the traditional 
case of national defense, the provision of security against terrorism thus becomes a mixed 
private/public good. A key result of the model is that the government should spend 
enough on fighting terrorism at its source, so as to nullify the incentives of private targets 
to invest in their own (local) security. The model allows also to explore the relative 
impact of R&D aimed at improving the effectiveness of spending on each type of 
strategy.   
 
  Section V attempts to draw implications for the design of a coherent defense 
R&D policy that would fit the changing nature of the threats facing the US, and in 
particular the characterization of the terrorist threat as discussed in previous sections. 
Intelligence (in the broad sense) emerges as the key aspect of the war against terrorism 
and, accordingly, R&D aimed at providing advanced technological means for improved 
intelligence is viewed as the cornerstone of defense R&D. Basic R&D for target-specific 
                                                                                                                                                   
1 At the beginning of the cold war the share of GDP devoted to R&D was just 1.4% (in 1953), it raised 
rapidly during the late 1950s to over 2%, and it has fluctuated since within the 2.3-2.9% range (see NSF’s   5
protection from terrorist threats, R&D to counter non-conventional threats, and cyber 
security are further important aspects of such policy.  
 
Section VI looks into the technological directions implied by the required 
antiterrorist R&D, and the implications for competition in the relevant markets. The 
provision of advanced means for intelligence and for target protection entails emulating 
human sensory perceptions through computerized sensory interfaces, and increasing 
dramatically the ability to analyze in real time vast amounts of information. Both have 
clear and direct civilian applications, and therefore the required R&D is mostly “dual 
use”. The development of big weapon systems during the cold war led to high 
concentration of both R&D and procurement into a few large corporations, conferring 
them a great deal of market power. By contrast, the development of sensory computer 
interfaces, Internet security, biological protection, and the like, entails an entirely 
different playfield: these systems are as said dual use, there is (also) a private market for 
them, and there exist already a large number of players that can partake in the required 
R&D. New R&D programs could be designed so as to preserve this much-needed 
diversity and to encourage further competition. Such programs may prove highly 
beneficial both for the required defense R&D and for the advanced sectors of the 
economy themselves, thus fostering economic growth. Section VII concludes with a 
summary of the principles upon which defense R&D policy for the antiterrorist era could 
be articulated.       
  
II.  Defense R&D: before and after 9/11
2 
Since the 1950’s and up to the 1990’s the predominant security threat facing the 
USA was of course that posed by the Soviet Union, a threat that lead to a relentless arms 
race.  The main goal of the USA military was, accordingly, to deter the USSR from 
attacking the USA or its allies (primarily western Europe), and if attacked, to be able to 
defeat any combination of threatening states (i.e. those making the Warsaw pact).
3 
                                                                                                                                                   
report at  http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/infbrief/nsf03307/start.htm#fig2). 
2 For an overview of the economics of defense R&D, see Lichtenberg (1995). 
3 A further goal was “containment” of the soviet influence around the world, but it is less clear how that 
goal influenced defense R&D.      6
Defense R&D thus had very clear goals to serve, there was a well-defined (leading) foe, 
and the rules of the game were also well defined, evolving rather slowly throughout the 
dynamic interaction with the USSR.
4 This lead to the building of a formidable defense 
R&D complex, including DARPA, federal labs (such as Livermore, Argonne, Oak 
Ridge), large private contractors (such as Lockheed, Grumman, Raytheon), research at 
major universities (such as MIT and Stanford), as well as the R&D performed at the 
various branches of the military themselves.  
 
Throughout the second half of the 20
th century this vast complex developed ever 
more powerful and accurate weapons, and in particular big weapon systems such as 
nuclear devices, intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines, large carriers, 
high-performing aircraft (including jetfighters, large transport planes, combat and 
transport helicopters, stealth aircraft), and so forth.
5 The logic of the cold war, of the arms 
race, dictated to a large extent the direction of R&D: thus for example, the prevalent 
“MAD” (mutually assured destruction) doctrine necessitated the development of nuclear 
subs, that could survive and operate autonomously even after a devastating nuclear attack 
on mainland USA, and deliver a retaliatory blow on the enemy. Conversely, various 
treaties with the USSR limited the development of antiballistic missiles.
6  
 
Fortunately for all involved, the logic of the MAD doctrine worked well, and the 
immense arsenal of highly sophisticated and lethal weapons developed in the course of 
the cold war, and in particular the big weapon systems, remained for the most part 
unutilized. It would seem that never before in history a relentless arms race terminated 
without a major confrontation, essentially by the internal (but not unrelated) collapse of 
one of the contenders. However, the enormous R&D resources poured into the 
development of those weapon systems over decades did achieve their goal: to deter a 
                                                 
4 See for example the various treaties restricting the development, testing and/or deployment of various 
weapon systems, such as ABM’s.  
5 For example, in the early 1980s a full 75% of federal outlays on defense R&D went to missiles and 
aircraft, two of the main items in the category of “big weapon systems” (see Mowery and Rosenberg, 
1989).  
6 Hence the lack at present of effective defensive systems against the missile threats posed by Iraq, Iran and 
North Korea (the “Patriot” system did not perform well during the 1991 Gulf war, and it remains to be seen 
if the newly developed Israeli “Arrow” system, or the improved Patriot will do better).     7
major armed conflict. In that sense the relative peace in which most of the world lived for 
half a century, certainly the American people, owes as much to defense R&D as to 
anything else.  
 
The collapse of the USSR shattered the basic premises that had guided defense 
R&D, primarily in that there was no longer a foe having commensurable capabilities and 
racing for parity or supremacy. Thus, attention gradually shifted away from the prospect 
of an all out war, to regional conflicts in which the USA may have a stake, as well as to 
issues stemming largely from the dismembering of the Soviet Union, such as preventing 
nuclear leakage.  A common denominator of these new challenges was that the mighty 
deterrence built over the decades of the cold war was no longer effective, if only because 
the USA could not conceivably resort to a nuclear strike against foes that did not pose a 
commensurable threat to the USA itself. Defense R&D was to serve then new goals such 
as the ability to fight simultaneously two regional conflicts (thus emphasizing rapid 
deployment, maintainability of equipment, etc.) and to minimize casualties in any 
confrontation (one of the legacies from the Vietnam war). Yet throughout the 1990s a big 
chunk of defense R&D was still devoted to big weapon systems, such as the development 
of new, high-performing and extremely expensive aircraft. Indeed, and perhaps not 
surprisingly, defense R&D exhibited a large degree of inertia, partly as a consequence of 
the fact that R&D expenses grow rapidly as a project moves forward from basic research 
towards development, testing and evaluation. Thus “legacy” projects that were conceived 
a decade or more earlier proceeded to absorb increasing R&D resources over time even 
though the need for them had virtually vanished.  
 
Much as the fall of the Soviet Union over a decade earlier marked the closing of 
an era, 9/11 signified the beginning of a new one, dominated by the worldwide terrorist 
threat (see Hoge and Rose, 2002). Of course, large-scale terrorism against the USA did 
not start with the attack on the WTC: the devastating attack on the US marine barracks in 
Beirut in 1983, the attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and in Dar e-Salaam in 1998, 
and the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 were painful indications of the evolving 
new threat. Yet 9/11 was qualitatively different, in that it was the first large-scale attack   8
on the homeland, of a far larger magnitude than anything done before. Indeed, 9/11 was 
the equivalent of a declaration of war, of total war, on the USA. Moreover, it was a 
declaration of war by a diffused, amorphous enemy, who did not put forward a clear set 
of demands, or even a well defined set of grievances (that could be negotiated away, or 
mitigated). The nature of the threat, and the accompanying challenge to USA security are 
thus unprecedented.  
 
The shock caused by 9/11 can be seen as a combination of Pearl Harbor and the 
Sputnik: a surprise attack resulting in initial stunning losses, the revelation of an 
unbearable degree of vulnerability, the birth of a major new threat to national security 
and the dearth of technological means to effectively face it. The latter is of course the key 
to the (re)design of a coherent defense R&D policy, having (once again) a well defined 
goal, namely, the development of the scientific and technological infrastructure to serve 
the long term war against terrorism. This goal has far reaching implications in terms of 
the direction of the defense R&D called forth, and, if pursued forcefully, would represent 
a significant departure from the kind of R&D done until then. Before analyzing in more 
detail what the war on terrorism requires, it is important to note what is not needed in this 
new era, thus suggesting a policy that involves primarily a reallocation of existing 
resources rather than increased expenditures.  
 
II.1 Defense R&D Stocks 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is no country (or plausible 
coalition of countries) that can challenge the present technological supremacy of the 
USA military.
7 Indeed, the defense R&D “stock” of the USA, developed and 
accumulated over the past decades, is far larger than that of any country(s) in the world.
8 
                                                 
7 I refer here just to the technological capabilities as manifested in the quality and effectiveness of the 
weapon systems, and not to the military stock, that is, the actual quantity of weapons (and manpower) 
available.  
8 R&D (or “Knowledge”) stock is a widely used concept (see e.g. Griliches, 1984), paralleling that of 
physical capital stock, and can be computed simply by accumulating lagged R&D expenditures, and 
assuming a given depreciation rate, usually significantly higher than that for physical capital. It is not clear 
what rate would be appropriate for computing a defense R&D stock, presumably it varies inter alia with 
the intensity of the arms race. Here I shall use a depreciation rate of 15% (which has become a sort of 
“focal” figure in this type of computations), but compute the stocks also for a 5% rate, in order to gain an 
idea of the range of uncertainty in that respect.     9
The only other sizable stock was that of the USSR, but that has shrunk dramatically after 
the collapse, and Russia cannot afford to renew it.
9 Japan has severe built-in constraints 
on spending in defense R&D making it a non-contender for the foreseeable future. 
Western Europe has advanced technological capabilities but has spent an order of 
magnitude less than the USA for the past decades and, barring a dramatic geo-political 
change, it will continue to do so in the future.  
 
In order to gain an idea of the actual magnitudes involved, I computed the defense 
R&D stocks generated during the decade of the 1990s (1991-2000) for the G8 countries 
that have had significant military R&D investments.
10 To insist, these are not the total 
stocks available, but only the portion added during the 1990s – these countries had 
substantial defense R&D stocks prior to that (particularly the US), generated during the 
long decades of the cold war. As table 1 reveals, the US accumulated during the 1990s an 
additional defense R&D stock over 10 times as high as the next largest (the UK if using a 
depreciation rate of 15%), 28 times that of Russia, and over 3 times that of the other 
countries combined. These are stunning differences, which give a quantitative sense of 
the technological supremacy referred to above.  
 
Some qualifications to these computations are in order. First, Table 1 quite likely 
overstates the actual technological gap between the USA and its allies, given that the 
USA exports to them military equipment embedding technological advances achieved by 
the R&D that goes into these stocks, and that some of the R&D projects are joint with 
them. On the other hand the extent of underreporting of defense R&D (due to secrecy – 
these are the so called “black programs”) is likely to be significantly higher in the USA 
than in Western Europe. Second, there are likely to be spillovers and leakages from the 
defense R&D done in the USA that enhance the technological capabilities of other 
countries. It is hard to believe though that these qualifications would alter significantly 
the picture that emerges from Table 1. 
 
                                                 
9 Note that Russia’s GDP is at present just about 1/40  that of the USA. 
10 Thus we exclude Canada and Italy.      10
Table 1 
Defense R&D stock as of 2000  
(in billions of constant 1998 $ US)
11 
 
stocks based on a depreciation rate of: G8 Countries 
15% 5% 
USA 197.23  301.64 
United Kingdom  18.21  28.03 
France 17.81  28.69 
Japan 9.96  14.78 
Germany 9.18  13.47 
Russia 7.14  11.06 
 
  Beyond the advanced nations, China is perhaps the only emerging power that 
may be a source of concern. However, a simple calculation indicates that the possibility 
of China posing a serious challenge to the defense R&D advantage of the US is rather 
unlikely: the USA spends about 0.4 percentage points of GDP on defense R&D. Given 
that China’s GDP is about one tenth that of the USA, in order to match the US current 
level of spending China would have to allocate a staggering 4% of its GDP to defense 
R&D, and maintain that level for many years, a rather farfetched scenario.
12 Furthermore, 
matching on a current basis would erase the initial huge advantage of the US only in the 
very long run. Essentially, the vastly larger economic resources of the USA vis a vis any 
other nation(s), and the fact that it already possesses a huge stock of military R&D gives 
the USA an unmatched technological advantage that cannot be challenged except if a 
dramatic geo-political change occurs. However, even if that were the case the USA will 
still have significant margins of time (and resources) to respond. 
                                                 
11  The data used in these computations are in appendix 1. Note that there is a significant degree of 
uncertainty regarding some of these data, particularly that of Russia, and hence these figures should be 
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where D1991+t denotes defense R&D expenditures in year 1991+t.  
12 One could argue that R&D costs in China are significantly lower than in the US, and hence matching the 
real amount of resources allocated by the US to defense R&D would entail significantly less than that.  
However, even if R&D costs were half as high in China, that still would entail allocating 2 % of GDP to 
military R&D, again a staggering amount.  To put that figure in perspective, notice that the share of China’s   11
 
II.2  The composition of defense R&D 
How much does the US invest in R&D aimed at big weapon systems versus other 
technological means that could help confront current threats to national security? To 
address this issue I proceed to examine in detail the composition of the defense R&D 
budget for FYs 2001-2003. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 
publishes a document named “RDT&E Programs”, which contains a listing of almost 800 
budget items, indicating the agency in charge, the type of program, the program name 
and the allocated budget (see appendix 2 for a listing of the top 20 items in the list). With 
the aid of expert officers of the Israeli Air Force, we managed to classify 369 out of the 
798 items listed, which account for about 90% of the budget.
13 The categories used were: 
•  B – Big weapon systems 
•  D – Ballistic Missile Defense  
•  I  – Intelligence 
•  T – Anti-Terrorism 
•  M – Miscellaneous (i.e. not elsewhere classified) 
 
By “big weapon systems” I mean traditional, large, complex weapon systems 
having mostly an offensive character, such as jetfighters, ICBMs, carriers, nuclear 
submarines, and the like. We define a separate category for “ballistic missile defense”, 
since these are defensive systems, relatively new, and meant to respond to present and 
future threats posed by the proliferation of long-range missile technologies to potentially 
hostile states. In case of doubt between “B” and “M” we opted for “M”, in order to 
prevent biasing the totals in favor of the argument put forward here. Intelligence is almost 
certainly underrepresented in these data, if only because the funding of the Directorate of 
Science and Technology of the CIA is (as far as I know) not included in these figures. 
The “T” category is almost surely understated as well, since it is very hard to discern 
what exactly qualifies as “anti-terrorism”: as it stands now it just includes all items 
related to chemical and biological warfare,
14 and a few others.
15 Moreover, the newly 
                                                                                                                                                   
GDP devoted to total military expenditure was 1.4% in 2001 according to official Chinese figures, or 2.1% 
according to (SIPRI,  2002).  
13 We sorted the items by the allocated budget, and examined the items from the top down; thus, although 
we classified only ~ 50% of the items, they account as said for ~ 90% of the total budget.   
14 Not all of it is related to anti-terrorism, but we could not tell that apart.    12
created Department of Homeland Security presumably commands additional budgets for 
antiterrorism-related R&D that are not included in our figures. “Miscellaneous” means 
“not elsewhere classified”, that is, it is the default category for all items that do not 
clearly belong into one of the others. There are likely to remain significant margins of 
error in the classification performed and, in particular, intelligence and anti-terrorism are 
quite certainly downward biased; however, the summary results presented in Tables 2a 
and 2b are still hopefully informative and in the right ballpark: 
 
Table 2a 
Distribution of Defense R&D – 2001-2003  
 (current thousand $)    
Category  FY 2001  FY  2002  FY  2003  
Big weapons systems  10,752,781 11,911,890  13,805,069 
Miscellaneous  12,107,023 14,029,675  14,407,247 
Ballistic Missile Defense  4,302,183 7,039,441  6,848,958 
Intelligence  2,953,072 3,378,629  4,490,930 
Anti-terrorism  754,140 902,937  1,394,472 
Not classified  4,497,512 4,081,025  4,178,031 
Total
16  35,366,710 41,343,596  45,124,706 
 
Table 2b 
Distribution of Defense R&D – 2001-2003  
(percentages)   
Category  FY 2001  FY  2002  FY  2003  
Big weapons systems  30.40% 28.81%  30.59% 
Miscellaneous  34.23% 33.93%  31.93% 
Ballistic Missile Defense  12.16% 17.03%  15.18% 
Intelligence  8.35% 8.17%  9.95% 
Anti-terrorism  2.13% 2.18%  3.09% 
Not classified  12.72% 9.87%  9.26% 
Total
   100.0 100.0  100.0 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
15 There is only one item that explicitly mentions the war on terrorism, “Combating Terrorism Technology 
Support”, Office of the Secretary of Defense, allocated just $49 million in 2003.   
16 The total amounts here are lower than the total defense R&D budgets (by about 10-15%): defense-related 
R&D done by other government agencies (such as NIH) is not included, there are other (apparently 
classified) items not reported in the published list, and moreover, some of the items listed in the cited 
document have not been assigned a dollar amount.     13
As Table 2 reveals, about 30% of the reported defense R&D is (still) allocated to 
big weapon systems. This category includes the development of systems that have no 
rival in the world, and moreover, it is not clear what sort of security threats these costly 
weapons are meant to forestall. The prime example is the F-22, a kind of technological 
marvel, extremely expensive aircraft, with projected capabilities beyond what could be 
regarded as real needs that current jetfighters could not appropriately fulfill.
17 On the 
other hand intelligence and anti-terrorism command only about 10-13% of the budget.
18 
As argued in coming sections, even if the true figures are significantly higher than these 
the percentage allocated to these key activities is still quite low, relative to their present 
and future importance for national security.  Therefore, it seems that the dramatic shift in 
the nature of the threats to national security since 9/11 have had so far little impact on the 
composition of R&D, and that calls for a prompt revision. One mitigating factor though 
may be just time: even if policy priorities shift, it takes a while to implement the desired 
changes, and in particular, it takes time to launch R&D programs to serve those changing 
priorities. For example, and as Figure 1 reveals, it took about 3 years to beef up NASA’s 
budget after Sputnik – we are not there yet post 9/11.   
  
III. The nature of the terrorist threat 
Present day terrorism, as manifested most potently in 9/11, poses a very different 
set of threats than the conventional, nation-against-nation type of conflicts that have been 
prevalent throughout most of history.
19 Confronting such novel threats presents a 
formidable challenge at all levels: to the current military, intelligence and police 
capabilities of the target countries, to their democratic institutions that need to strike a 
delicate balance in pursuing this war; and also to the scientific and technological 
resources that need to be mobilized in order to devise the appropriate technological 
                                                 
17As David Gold writes in SIPRI (2002), “The F-22…was designed during the cold war to counter an 
expected new generation of Soviet aircraft and air defenses that never materialized. The F-15, which the   
F-22 will replace, gives the USA air superiority over any conceivable enemy well into the future. Thus, the 
F-22 may be a system without a threat to combat…” Estimates are that a fully equipped plane will cost well 
above $100 million.  
18 Still, in (nominal) dollar terms intelligence and antiterrorist related R&D increased by over 50% from FY 
2001 to FY 2003.    14
means to combat terror. The later require the design of a coherent and well-articulated 
R&D policy, which should be based on the systematic analysis of the nature of these 
threats, in and of themselves, and in contrast to those posed by conventional conflicts. 
The goal of this section is thus to set the framework for such analysis, and in particular to 
try to identify the distinguishing features of the terrorist threat that have salient 
implications for R&D policy.
20  
 
Let me start with two general points. The first is that present day terrorism is 
based upon and exploits huge asymmetries between the perpetrators and the victims: 
asymmetry in the perceived value of life (leading inter alia to suicidal attacks); 
asymmetry in the means of combat (relatively simple for terrorists, highly sophisticated 
and powerful for the target countries); asymmetry in the information available on each 
side: mostly open information on the potential targets/victims, versus highly secretive, 
compartmentalized behavior of terrorists, and so forth. That is not so (for the most part) 
in conventional conflicts between nations, and therefore a great deal of the capabilities 
accumulated in any country in the course of contemplating or having been engaged in 
such conflicts are rendered ineffective for the war on terror. In particular, many of the 
weapon systems developed by the leading industrialized nations over the 20
th century, 
and in particular those developed in the course of the cold war, are not appropriate to 
fight terrorism. Thus, R&D policy in this context will have to depart from established 
premises, and offer novel options.       
 
The second observation is that one cannot expect a clear, decisive victory in the 
war on terror, that once and for all would defeat the enemy. Furthermore, in this kind of 
war there is no possibility of circumscribing the contest, the race, with formal agreements 
or treaties as those that were concluded with the USSR during the cold war. Therefore, 
                                                                                                                                                   
19It is also very different than previous instances of terrorism, particularly in that most terrorist 
organizations operated locally (within their own countries), and had as goals igniting some sort of drastic 
internal political change.  
20 In doing this we follow Arrow (1962), in the sense that the role of R&D and of government policy in this 
regard should follow from an understanding of the nature of the “good” in question: Arrow dissected the 
nature of knowledge and of knowledge creation, whereas here we are trying to understand the peculiarities 
of the war against terror, as opposed to conventional warfare, and derive from it the contours of an 
appropriate defense R&D policy.    15
one should proceed on the premise that this will be a lengthy, protracted confrontation, 
entailing long-term, persistent threats. Accordingly, R&D aimed at it should be multi-
layered in time, in the sense of being able to generate technological responses for the 
short, medium, and long run.  I turn now to more specific characteristics of the terrorist 
threat: the key role of uncertainty, limited deterrence, and the private/public good aspects 
of providing security in this context.  
 
III.1 The role of uncertainty 
A key feature of the terrorist threat is the generalized, diffused nature of it, that is, 
the fact that there is a large degree of uncertainty regarding where, when and how 
terrorists may strike. Such uncertainty is what greatly magnifies the terrorist threat, far 
beyond what it would take to confront the terrorists if faced with them, or the actual 
damage that any single terrorist strike may cause. Indeed, if the authorities had advance 
knowledge of the timing and location of a future attack, actually thwarting it would be a 
relatively minor affair, involving the deployment of little police or military power.
21  
 
That is not so in conventional warfare: confronting say an invasion by a foreign 
power necessitates vast military capabilities, even if one knows when and where the 
attack will take place. The same applies to a nuclear confrontation: the “MAD” doctrine 
required that each party had the capability to nearly annihilated the other, regardless of 
being able to know in advance the timing and exact targets of an attack. In other words, 
the sine qua none to fight a conventional or even a nuclear war is a powerful army, 
measured by the strength and technological means available to its forces: surprise or not, 
in the end wars are decided by the outcome of the actual clash between the foe armies.
22 
By contrast, fighting terrorism involves first and foremost reducing uncertainty, avoiding 
surprises. If we knew where say Al-Qaeda cells are, apprehending or destroying them 
would be a relatively easy task; likewise, if we could detect terrorists as they try to 
                                                 
21 Consider for example what would have taken to prevent 9/11, had the FBI known in advance the plan: a 
score of arrests in several locations, conducted by a few hundred agents – a trivial operation relative to the 
magnitude of the threat.  
22 This is not the deny of course the role of surprise: when posed to launch the offensive on the Nazis, the 
allies invested great efforts in deception, that is, in creating uncertainty as to where and when D-day would   16
approach or enter a target, then neutralizing them should be the easy part.
   Even 
narrowing down the geographical area and/or the time window of a possible terrorist 
strike can greatly simplify the task of thwarting the attack.  
 
The inherent uncertainty of the terrorist threat is also what exerts a heavy price on 
the threatened nation, far beyond the actual damage that may be inflicted once the attack 
occurs. That is, individual terrorist acts or even a series of them may not compromise 
national security at large, in the sense of hurting a large proportion of the civilian 
population, or damaging a significant chunk of the economy or, to take it to an extreme, 
posing a danger of losing sovereignty to a foreign power or to an alien extremist group. 
And yet the uncertainty as to when and where these acts may occur may have far 
reaching effects, both in terms of economic costs (e.g. the provision of security at a 
myriad potential targets, reduced investments because of generalized uncertainty, 
disruption of travel, tourism, and perhaps also trade), psychological costs, and painful 
changes in established norms, behaviors and “way of life” (e.g. invasion of privacy for 
the sake of prevention, avoidance of skyscrapers, reduced travel and tourism, etc.).  It is 
precisely because of the uncertainty that accompanies the terrorist threat, and the 
associated costs, that few terrorists, armed with relatively primitive means, can 
effectively threaten whole countries, even the most powerful of them.  
 
III.2 Limited deterrence 
  One of the novel and most disturbing aspects of present day terrorism is the fact 
that the perpetrators are ready to commit suicide in order to fulfill their mission, and 
furthermore, that some of their attacks are based upon suicide, as in 9/11. Indeed, there is 
a huge difference between readiness to die for a cause but still hoping to get away alive, 
and planning from the start to commit suicide in the course of the attack, as an integral 
and unavoidable part of the plan. Perhaps the most serious implication of the latter is that 
the possibility of deterrence is greatly reduced, at least in the sense that the perpetrators 
have nothing to fear for themselves. There still might be some deterrence possible if for 
                                                                                                                                                   
take place. Yet, it is hard to imagine that any outcome of significance for the war depended upon the 
success of the deception campaign.    17
example the terrorists were based in a sympathetic host country (as was the case with 
Afghanistan), and hence the victim could retaliate against the host country; similarly if 
terrorists had families or wider social networks in known places that could be affected ex 
post. However, after the war in Afghanistan that seems to be less and less the case.  
 
  Limited deterrence implies that there is little use for offensive weapon systems 
that in conventional confrontations would be perceived by the potential attacker as posing 
an  ex post threat. Thus, suicidal terrorism neutralizes to a large extent the initial 
advantage that advanced countries (the potential victims from terror) had in terms of 
military might, since such military capabilities are rendered vacuous by denying their 
deterrence value.  
 
III.3 National Security: still a public good? 
National defense (or national security) has been traditionally regarded as the 
prototypical type of public good.
23 This is not just a definitional matter, but has far 
reaching normative implications: given the “pure” public good nature of defense, 
economic logic has it that governments should be in charge of supplying it, and in fact 
have exclusivity at it. Moreover, doing so may be one of the main justifications for the 
very existence of a government, even in societies patterned after strict market principles. 
Indeed, defense ranks higher as a public good than, say, “maintaining Law and Order”, 
since the latter could be provided by local communities in a decentralized fashion (as has 
been the case in many instances throughout history), whereas for a given political entity 
as a whole (e.g. “nation”, “state”) defense can hardly be decentralized. Let me restate 
those aspects of a good or service that make it “public” rather than private:
24 First, public 
goods are said to be non-rival in consumption, that is, the total amount of the good 
produced can be “consumed” by each and every individual in society. By contrast, the 
total amount of a private good produced is divided among consumers, so that if one 
consumes more others necessarily will consume less.  Second, agents providing a private 
                                                 
23 See for example Gold (1999) for a discussion of defense as a public good in the international context. 
24 In addition to these, the provision of some public and quasi-public goods entails indivisibilities, that is, 
minimal large-size investments in production, as for example with mass transport, dams, etc.  
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good can prevent others from getting access to the good and consuming it (for example, 
excluding those that refuse to pay for it), whereas there are no effective exclusion 
mechanisms for public goods. That is, it is hard or impossible to prevent anybody that so 
desires from getting access and enjoying the public good. 
 
Thinking of national defense as protection from foreign threats that may in 
principle affect the country as a whole, it is clear that the two attributes of public goods 
strictly hold for it: (i) non-rivalry - each citizen enjoys the full amount of defense 
produced; (ii) it is impossible to exclude citizens that say, don’t pay taxes, from enjoying 
the protection from foreign threats offered by the defense capabilities supplied in the 
country.  However, and as the discussion below indicates, the nature of defense is much 
more complex in the context of the war against terrorism.   
 
As already mentioned, a key feature of terrorism is that the threat is generalized 
(i.e. it can happen anywhere, anytime), and yet any particular attack is “local”, in that it 
entails striking at a particular location that constitutes, even in the worse of cases, a small 
fraction of the country as a whole. Accordingly, confronting terrorism entails two very 
different strategies: the first consists of fighting the terrorist threat at its source, namely, 
intelligence gathering, pinpoint strikes at terrorist cells, denying bases in countries 
abroad, etc. The second entails deploying resources to protect likely targets in the 
homeland. It is intuitively clear that the first strategy does retain the public good nature of 
defense, whereas the second strategy makes the provision of defense mostly a local 
public good, even conveying negative externalities.  
 
Consider for example the threat of terrorist bombings against civilian targets in 
the form of (local) public places that attract large numbers of people, such as shopping 
malls or big office buildings. In the absence of specific information on where and when 
the attack may take place, protecting against such threat involves setting up some form of 
security system at each such location. That may take the form of security guards, checks 
on each person entering the facility, metal detectors, sniffing machines for luggage, and 
so forth. Clearly, the deployment of a security system of that sort at a specific potential   19
target location serves first and foremost those present at or otherwise associated with that 
location, thus becoming a local public good. Moreover, increasing security at one 
particular location may actually increase the risk to adjacent locations, since terrorists are 




In the case of airports the issue is more complex, as was painfully realized in 
9/11: most of the victims were located far away from the departure sites and had nothing 
to do with air travel. In fact, securing airports serves a much wider purpose than just 
protecting those directly associated with it, and hence it is surely closer to a public good. 
In the case of public utilities, the effects of a terrorist attack may also be much wider in 
scope than those occurring at the plant itself and its immediate surroundings. As these 
examples reveal, there is actually a wide spectrum of possible cases, ranging from strictly 
local targets, to those that may serve just as entry points for more generalized threats, to 
targets that attacks upon them may have widespread repercussions. I focus in the analysis 
just on the polar cases in order to sharpen the issues at stake, but we should keep in mind 
that actual threats may lie somewhere in between.    
 
These qualifications notwithstanding, terrorism has indeed caused national 
security to become partly a private good, and therefore the provision of defense is no 
longer strictly confined to the government, but has been to some extent “privatized.” Of 
course, security in general (e.g. protection from local crime such as theft, violence, 
sabotage, industrial espionage) has always been to some extent privately supplied, and 
there is indeed a sizable cottage industry already in place that does that. In that sense the 
tension between the two strategies described above may be seen as a replay of the tension 
that may exist in any urban center between say preventive police action on the one hand, 
and placing private guards or security systems at specific locations on the other. There 
are of course huge differences between terrorism and traditional forms of crime, having 
to do primarily with the relative magnitude of the threats, the underlying causes and 
                                                 
25 But there may be also positive externalities, as in other security context – see for example Ayres and 
Levitt (1998).   20
ultimate aims of each, and the national (and even cultural) significance of the threats. 
These differences surely enhance the role of the government in protecting from terrorism 
versus traditional crime, and yet there are wide margins left for the private provision of 
security. Moreover, distributional considerations for government intervention are surely 
more compelling in the case of terrorism.
26   
 
IV. A model of terrorism
27 
There are three parties involved in the “game” of terrorism: (i) the terrorists, 
whose aim is to inflict damage to potential targets, and hence their “utility” is a positive 
function of the losses suffered by their victims; (ii) the potential targets: think of them as 
firms that, absent terrorism would go about their business as usual and receive a certain 
payoff (e.g. profits, utility, rents), but under the threat of terrorism have to factor in the 
risk of being hit, loosing the payoff and incurring a further loss; (iii) the government, who 
maximizes the expected benefits accruing to the targets, taking into account the behavior 
of the other actors. The cornerstone of the model suggested here is the discrete choice 
problem facing the terrorists, which we think of as a nested model: the terrorists have to 
decide whether to strike or not, and if they do then which target to hit. This decision-
making problem generates a set of probabilities over those possible actions. Potential 
targets can affect those probabilities through their decisions of how much to invest in 
their own security. Finally, the government decides how much to invest in fighting 
terrorism at its source, thus also affecting the probabilities attached to the various options 
facing terrorists.  
                                                 
26 Distributional considerations refer to the fact that public places that cater to low-income segments of the 
population may invest little in security, and thus became more likely targets. However, such outcome may 
be perceived as unfair, much as denying medical care to those unable to pay for it is widely regarded as 
morally untenable. 
27 Enders and Sandler (1995) provide an excellent review of the economic literature on terrorism, both 
theoretical and empirical, up to early 1990s. Reflecting the nature of terrorism at the time, the dominant 
concerns addressed by this literature are (i) whether to bargain or not with terrorists posing concrete 
demands to governments; (ii) formation of treaties between countries to counter terrorism, and whether to 
abide or not by these treaties; (iii) strategic interactions between countries which are potential targets of 
terrorism. These issues lend themselves naturally to game theoretic analysis, which provides indeed with 
illuminating insights. The model developed here is similar in many ways to the formulations found in this 
literature (e.g. the decision tree of terrorists), but the focus is quite different. In particular, the interplay 
between government action and that of private potential targets, which is key here, seems to be altogether 
absent from previous models.    21
 
Let   j=1…n  index potential targets. If hit, target  j  suffers a loss of  Lj’; if not it 
carries on and receives a (normalized) payoff of  1. Each target spends  xj  on its own 
security. Denoting  Lj= Lj’+1, the  (conditional) random utility of terrorists if hitting 
target   j  is, 
  
(1)      j j j j x L V ε β + − =         
 
Thus, and conditional on striking, terrorists will chose a target so as to  j
j
V Max   . 
Assuming that  j ε  is i.i.d. and has a Weibull distribution, the conditional probability that 
target  j  will be hit is the usual MNL, 
 
















The “inclusive value” of the targets to the terrorists, i.e. the expected maximum utility if 
they strike is, 
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Denote by  T  the benefits to the terrorists of being able to carry a terrorist strike, 
beyond the damage it actually inflicts (i.e. the propaganda value, demonstration effect, 
chances of getting additional finance, etc.). Suppose that the government invests  X  in 
fighting terror at its source. Normalizing the value to the terrorists of not striking to 1, the 
probability that terrorists will strike is, 
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where 0 < λ  < 1 is the usual nested-logit parameter that mitigates the IIA problem,
28 and 
α    stands for the “effectiveness” of the government’s security outlays. Diagrammatically, 











The unconditional probability of target  j  being hit is thus   j j p p π ≡ .  We can write 
now the objective function of target  j, that is, the expected value of its net benefits, 
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Notice that not only   j π  but also  p  are a function of  xj. However, if there is a large 
number of similar targets and hence the  j π ’s are very small (i.e. on the order of 1/n), 
then the impact of a marginal change in the security outlays of any single target on  p  










Therefore, we assume that when maximizing  Ej  target j takes  p  as given. Once again, 
being just one of many, it also takes as given the outlays of the other targets, hence, 
                                                 
28 That is, if λ =1 we are back into the MNL for the whole choice set including the option of not striking, 
and therefore the ratio of the probability of not striking and of striking a particular target remains constant 
even if identical targets are added or removed, which is of course highly implausible.  
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The FOC for Max Ej is simply, 
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Figure 2 presents a diagrammatic analysis of (6). Note first that, for any 
1 0 ≤ ≤ j π ,  25 . 0 ) 1 ( ≤ − j j π π , and therefore for there to be a maximum the following 
condition needs to hold:  4      25 . 0 1 ≥ ⇒ ≤ ≡ j j L p c pL β β .  That is, the losses, and/or 
the probability of a terrorist strike, and/or the effectiveness of the private security 
spending have to be “large enough” (for example, c’’ in Figure 2 does not fulfill this 
condition). Second, the conditional probability of a strike against target  j  should be at 
the optimum smaller than such probability if target j chooses not to spend any resources 
on its own security, that is,  
*
j π ) 0 (   j π ≤ . Thus, in Figure 2  when the parameters are 
such that  ' 1 c pLj = β , the optimal level of spending is zero.
29 When these conditions 
hold, the provision of security from terrorist attacks turns in fact into a quasi private 
good, that is, there are incentives for private parties to invest in their own security.  As 
can be easily seen in Figure 2, 
*
j x   is an increasing function of  j L pβ , i.e. each potential 
target will spend more on its own security the higher the probability that there will be a 
strike, the larger the expected losses, and the higher the “effectiveness” of its security 
outlays,  β .  
 
  As already mentioned, target  j  sees the impact of  xj  on  p as negligible, and 
therefore disregards that effect when setting its optimal level of spending on security. But 
                                                 
29 If  5 . 0 ) 0 ( < j π  then the condition  
*
j π ) 0 (   j π ≤  is more stringent than the former, in that it requires 
that  j L pβ   be even larger for there to have  0
* ≥ j x .   24
what about spending voluntarily on X, that is, on fighting terror at its source, thereby 
bringing   p  down directly? Writing  X L X p E j j j − − = ) ( 1 π ,  we note that the FOC 
for  j X E Max  is, 
(7)           
j jL
X p X p
απ
1
)] ( 1 )[ ( = −  
 
  Comparing (7) to (6), and assuming for the moment  β α ≈ , we see that in the 
denominator of the r.h.s. of (7) we have   j π   rather than  p  in (6), and that makes the 
whole difference: once again, the basic assumption is that there are very many targets,  
j π   is very small (on the order of 1/n), and in particular   j π << p. Therefore, whereas the 
condition for there to be an optimal  xj > 0 is likely to hold, that is not so for there to be 
an optimal (private) X>0. Thus, it is highly unlikely that private parties would be willing 
to contribute voluntarily to fighting terror at its source, and hence that role is left to the 
government. On the other hand it is plausible that each potential target will spend on its 
own security.  
 
  The provision of security against terror takes then a dual nature: a public good on 
the one hand (i.e. reducing the likelihood of a strike by fighting terror at its source), 
which is the traditional case, and a quasi private good, namely, each potential target 
spending on its own security.  
 
IV.1  Externalities 
As opposed to the classic case of defense as a pure public good, in the present 
case a dollar spent on enhancing the security of a potential target has two opposite 
effects. The first is zero-sum: conditional on a strike taking place, an extra dollar of  xj  
decreases the probability of a strike against target  j, and thereby it necessarily increases 
the probability of the other potential targets being hit. That is, enhancing the security of a 
particular target confers a negative externality to all other potential targets. On the other 
hand, an increase in  xj   reduces the inclusive value of striking (i.e. it lowers I in (4)), 
which lowers   p  and hence confers a positive externality. That is, enhanced security at   25
any particular target reduces the attractiveness of striking in general, and hence lowers 
the likelihood of an attack for everybody.  
 
The net effect though is negative: Denoting by  ) 1 ( j j i p p π − = ≠  the unconditional 
probability of targets other than  j  being hit, we show in appendix 3 that    0 / > ∂ ∂ ≠ j j i x p . 
That is, the net impact of enhancing the security of a particular target is to increase the 
risk faced by others.  
 
IV.2  The relative effect of  X versus xj 
From the point of view of society as a whole, the key issue is how to reduce  p, 
the likelihood of a strike. Thus, one way of assessing the relative effectiveness of the two 
types of expenditures on security,  X  and  xj, is to compare their effect on  p. Recall that,  
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Thus, and assuming for a moment that  n j / 1 ≈ π   and   β α ≈ ,  a marginal dollar spent on  
X  is about   n/λ    times as effective as a dollar spent on   xj.  In other words, the per dollar 
benefits of devoting resources to fight terror at its source, which constitutes a public 
good, are much larger than those derived from enhancing the security of individual 
targets. This is hardly surprising, but the magnitude of the difference is sobering.  
 
 
IV.3  How much  X  versus  x? 
The analysis so far provides the background for one of the key questions that arise 
in this context, namely, how much should the government invest in the S-strategy, taking 
into account of course the behavior of the other parties to the game. We can think of the 
government as maximizing the expected value of the benefits to potential targets, net of 
the costs of investing in the S and L-strategies. In the symmetric case (i.e. when Lj = L for 
all  j), the objective function is (recall that the payoff to each target is assumed to be  1),  
   26
(9)        W = p (n – L) + (1 – p) n – nx – X = n – pL – nx - X 
 
That is, with probability  p  there will be an attack on a particular target, which will incur 
a loss of  L = (L’+1), and thus total benefits will be just (n – L), whereas with probability 
(1 - p) there is no attack and hence benefits are  n. Each target spends  x  on its own 
security, and the government spends  X  on the S-strategy. The government moves first 
and sets  X,  taking into account how targets will behave in the second stage, when setting  
x  optimally. Hence, 
 (9)’       W = n – p[x(X), X] L – nx(X) – X 
 
Maximizing (9)’ the FOC is, 
 































In the symmetric case, with  π j(xj) = 1/n,  the optimality condition for each target 
becomes,  
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] ), ( [
1
  ) / 1 1 )( / 1 (  
X X x Lp
n n
β
= −  
 
Notice that  L, n, and  β   are parameters, and hence what adjusts is  p[x(X), X]: given  
X, targets will invest  in  x  so as to make the condition hold. Thus, in equilibrium,  
 
















Therefore (10) becomes simply, 
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∂ .  In the symmetric case all targets move in unison, 













x , and (13) becomes, 













Given that the l.h.s. of (13)’ is made up of parameters, this equality obviously cannot 
hold but by coincidence. Notice that  λ <1, and that  n  is supposed to be very large, hence 
normally    1 >>
βλ
α
n .  
 
The meaning of (13)’ is quite transparent: starting from any given  X>0,  either there is 
an equilibrium  x>0  given by (11), or  x=0. If the former is true, then a small change in  
X  would lead targets to readjust as shown, e.g. an increase in  X  by one dollar decreases 
each target’s spending on own security by  βλ α / . Since all targets behave the same way, 
the total savings of resources in local security are   βλ α / n . On the other hand the extra 
cost of spending an additional dollar on the S-strategy is just that, one dollar. Thus, (13)’ 
just says that the government should increase its spending until the marginal gain (in 
terms of savings in local security), ) / ( X x n ∂ ∂ − , equals the marginal cost. But savings 
are bounded from below by the fact that  x≥ 0, and since both marginal gains and costs 
are constant, the equality cannot hold. The optimal amount of spending on the S-strategy, 
to be denoted by  X
*  is thus given by,
30 
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30 Conditions for the existence of  X
*  are given in Appendix 3.    28
The model thus provides a clear, sharp-edged answer to the question posed: the 
government should spend on fighting terrorism at its source as much as it takes so as to 
induce private targets to spend nothing on local security. In other words, the optimal 
rule is that the government should bring  p  down (via expenditures in the S-strategy) to 




Ideally then we should see large amounts of resources being spent on intelligence 
and related S-strategy activities, and none on the L-strategy. In practice though we see 
large and increasing amounts being spent on local security. That may be so for two 
reasons: (i) the government does not spend enough on the S-strategy; (ii) individual 
targets overestimate the probabilities that they will be hit, or otherwise attach additional 
psychological benefits to local security that go beyond the stark logic of our models. 
Further research is needed to elucidate these issues.     
 
Some qualifications of this key result are in order. First, the costs of financing the 
S-strategy are assumed to be linear, that is, each additional dollar “costs” the same 
regardless of how much the government spends. However, if it gets increasingly costly to 
finance spending on the S-strategy (for example, if the government has to resort to more 
distortionary taxes, or to borrow at increasingly higher interest rates), then one may 
obtain a solution by which the optimal spending on the S-strategy stops short of 
nullifying the incentives of potential targets to spend on the L-strategy. However, this is a 
rather unlikely scenario, in view of the fact that spending on S-strategy-related activities 
constitutes a very small fraction of the federal budget. In addition, it is not clear why the 
costs of government finance would be more convex than those of the private sector 
(potential targets), which is what is needed to alter the result. Similarly, one could 
consider breaking the linearity in the benefits side, for example by postulating  β    not as 
a constant but as a decreasing function of  X, possibly leading to an interior solution with  
                                                 
31 Note that in the classic case of a public good (such as national defense), the government has to supply it 
because there are no private incentives to do so (at least not in the required quantities); by contrast, in the 
present case the government has to allocate enough resources to the public good so as to prevent private 
agents from spending on (local) security, because such spending is highly inefficient.    29
x
*>0. These are legitimate variations to be considered, and hence the basic result   
x(X
*)=0 should be regarded as a benchmark, to be revised as we learn more about the 
determining factors.   
 
 IV.3 The impact of R&D 
R&D can be thought of in the present context as innovative activity aimed at 
increasing the effectiveness of spending on security, which in terms of the model means 
increasing the parameters  α   and  β . Taking again reductions in  p  as the criterion for 
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where   D R & / ' ∂ ∂ = α α  , and similarly for   ' β . Thus, assuming for the moment that 
' ' β α ≈ , R&D devoted to fighting terrorism at its source is likely to be much more 
effective than R&D aimed at local security, since surely   i i ix x X ∑ = >> π , that is, 
since the total expenditures on fighting terrorism at the source are surely larger than the 
average expenditure on own security by individual targets. In addition,  λ  < 1, which 
further plays in favor of  α . 
 
 
V.  R&D to counter terrorism – policy implications  
The dual nature of defense in the context of the war against terrorism maps also 
into the allocation of resources to R&D: should the Government engage in and/or pay for 
R&D aimed at improving the means available to both fight terror at its source and protect 
the population from its consequences? First, we know that even in the context of purely 
private goods, a market economy may well underinvest in R&D: the fact that R&D 
generates spillovers implies that the social rate of return is typically higher than the   30
private return, and hence that private investment in R&D may fall short of the socially 
desirable level. Thus, even if providing security from terrorism was deem to be entirely a 
private good, there would be room for government support to antiterrorism-related R&D, 
for example in the context of the Advanced Technology Program (ATP).  
 
As we have seen though, there is a component of the fight against terror that 
clearly has a public good nature, and that is the one associated with the S-strategy, that is, 
security outlays aimed at diminishing  p, the likelihood of a terrorist strike. This involves 
locating, monitoring and intercepting terrorist cells around the world, disrupting their 
logistical and financial base, limiting their access and mobility, and so forth, so that the 
ability or readiness of terrorists to carry out attacks are impaired as much as possible. 
Therefore, R&D aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of these outlays should be the 
government’s responsibility, much as the provision of traditional national security-related 
R&D has always been.
32 One of the key aspects of the S-strategy is intelligence, that is, 
the gathering of information on terrorists – masterminds, operatives, and supporters – 
their modes of operation, sources and channels of finance, and above all, as much detail 
as possible on their future plans. As noted in section III, one of the distinguishing features 
of the terrorist threat is the generalized, diffused nature of it, that is, the fact that there is a 
great deal of inherent uncertainty regarding where and when terrorists will strike. 
Intelligence broadly means the reduction of such uncertainty, it conveys vast, generalized 
benefits, and therefore it is the crucial tool and the preeminent public good in the context 
of the fight against terror. R&D aimed at providing better intelligence capabilities has 
therefore very high social payoffs, suggesting that it should be made the cornerstone of 
R&D policy in the war against terrorism.  
 
In terms of R&D aimed at the L-strategy, there may be a role for the government 
even though it is quite likely that local security would be provided privately, since as 
                                                 
32 Notice that, as with traditional national security, that does not necessarily mean that the R&D should be 
performed by government agencies, nor that the government should necessarily pay for all or most the 
R&D costs: as long as the Government commits to purchase the security products that result from the 
R&D, private suppliers may share the R&D costs and the associated risks.    31
already mentioned, the market may still underinvest in R&D for the usual reasons.
33 
Furthermore, there is certainly a role for the government in promoting basic research that 
feeds into down-the-line R&D aimed at enhancing local security, much as it does for 
most basic research in virtually all areas of science and technology: ever since Arrow 
(1962), it is well understood that basic research generates the most spillovers, the benefits 
from it are inherently very hard to appropriate, and hence it is up to the government to 
promote and subsidize it.  
 
There are two additional areas that also call for a government role: R&D aimed at 
protecting from non-conventional terrorists threats (see appendix 4), and R&D for 
improved cyber security. The former differs from a conventional terrorist threat 
obviously in the scope of the potential damage, making them a “macro” threat and thus 
turning the provision of security against them into a classic public good, with the usual 
implications. With the proliferation of internet-based or just interconnected computerized 
infrastructure systems, threats at computer and communications networks have acquired 
once again a “macro” dimension (again, because of the scope and reach of the damage 
that may be inflicted), and therefore it is upon the government to play a key role in 
confronting them, particularly in the conduct of R&D. 
 
Beyond R&D in purely technological fields, research in the behavioral and social 
sciences may also play a significant role in confronting terrorism: first, in understanding 
the motivations, the psychological makeup and the wider sociological context of 
terrorists, as well as contributing cultural, political and economic factors. Second, in 
dealing with the psychological and socio-economic effects of the terrorist threat on the 
targeted population, including the perception of probabilities that influences in turn the 




                                                 
33 This is so in spite of the fact that, as mentioned in section IV, the level of spending in local security 
should be zero, provided that the government spends “enough” on the S-strategy.    32
V. Defense R&D: technological directions and market competition 
  
  Both intelligence and protection of potential targets require the development of 
sensory computer interfaces, to be used for detection and intelligence gathering. As the 
analysis above suggests, increasing detection capabilities (in the broad sense), should be 
one of the main goals of defense R&D. The protection of targets as well as the 
identification of suspects require enhanced ability to detect weapons, explosives, 
bacteriological materials and other potentially dangerous devices, being carried by 
individuals, shipped over different means of transportation, stored in hidden places, etc. It 
also requires positive identification of individuals, both of suspects and of those with 
legitimate access permits to designated places.  
 
These screening and detection capabilities should allow for the fast and reliable 
screening of people, containers, and luggage with minimal disruption to economic 
activity, travel, and privacy. This is a very tall order, considering the staggering number 
of people going daily through airports and other transport modes, entering big office 
buildings, government offices, infrastructure facilities, and similarly for the number of 
containers shipped, parcels mailed, and so forth. Another set of capabilities that need to 
be enhanced are those related to eavesdropping and interception of all sorts of 
communications, ranging from those taking place over regular phone lines anywhere in 
the world, to conversations inside caves in eastern Afghanistan, or in underground 
parking lots in New York.        
 
  The common denominator of this vast array of required capabilities is that one 
needs to be able to emulate human senses (to hear, to “see” and “recognize”, to smell, to 
“touch and feel”) in automated, computerized ways. That is, one needs to create smart, 
sensory interfaces between computerized detection systems and the physical world, that 
will be able to activate those senses in fast, reliable ways as a matter of routine.
34  
                                                 
34See for example Appendix 3: “A collaborative effort…will investigate the reliable identification of 
specific individuals, even when attempts have been made to alter appearance, by measuring the “biometric” 
signatures of people passing through, for example, airports. The effort will range from development of 
surveillance sensors to algorithms that interpret their data and automatically alert operators to potentially 
dangerous people.”   33
 
  I emphasize this required change in the direction of technical change (i.e. 
emulating human sensory perceptions), because in fact computer technology has 
developed historically in a very asymmetric, skewed way vis a vis human capabilities: it 
sought relentlessly to improve the “brain” (i.e. the central processor), while keeping a 
primitive sensory interface. Call it the “Helen Keller model” of computer technology: 
virtually deaf, dumb, blind, (and lacking also tact or smell), but highly intelligent (i.e. 
capable of performing enormous amounts of routine computations). This has been, on 
reflection, a very peculiar path of technological development, dictated in part by the 
constraints of scientific knowledge, but also by the predominant type of uses that 
computers were put to work on.  
 
There is however increased recognition that developing computerized sensory 
interfaces is extremely important for a wide and rapidly expanding array of civilian uses, 
ranging from automobiles (e.g. voice-activated computerized commands, improved 
safety technologies, preventive maintenance, etc.), to medicine, to consumer appliances 
and gadgetry. This is in fact one of the technological frontiers attracting a great deal of 
attention, both in basic and applied research. Thus, defense R&D devoted to this area is 
very likely to have immediate, direct spillovers to civilian uses.   Presumably, there have 
been spillovers from “traditional” defense R&D all along (even if these are hard to 
quantify). The difference is that in this case the technological frontier that defense (anti-
terror) R&D is supposed to push is the same as that required for progress in civilian uses. 
That is not the case with, say, improvements in nuclear weapons or in stealth technology: 
in those cases the gradient of technological advance in military R&D has no direct 
relevance for civilian purposes, and the spillovers, if at all, are only indirect. 
 
Another area that calls for increased R&D resources is fast analysis of vast 
amounts of information, as best exemplified by the need to go over staggering amounts of 
voice, data and email messages intercepted by the NSA and other agencies (referred to as 
“fusion”). It would seem that the rate of growth of communications (i.e. of the amount of 
messages being transmitted over an expanding range of modes: fixed line and cellular   34
phones, satellites, the various wireless modes, fax, email) is at least as fast if not faster 
than the rate of improvement in computer capabilities aimed at analyzing them. Thus, in 
order to shorten substantially the delays in doing so (that have proven critical for the 
ability to identify terrorist threats in “real time”), the technologies in question would have 
to undergo significant breakthroughs.  Again, this gradient of technological progress fits 
also well-defined civilian needs, as for example in terms of the data analysis requirements 
associated with the genome project and its aftermath (and even more so the 
corresponding program for mapping proteins), or more generally “data mining” in 
businesses, that has become an increasingly important activity in a wide range of sectors.   
 
What is required then is the setting up of R&D programs that would support 
mainly the development of sensory computer interfaces for detection and intelligence 
gathering, and of computer technologies for massive data analysis. As said, the systems 
sought are for the most part “dual use”, in the sense that they have both defense and 
civilian applications to begin with.
35 This is very different from cold-war defense R&D, 
aimed primarily at big weapon systems. As to the overall budget for defense R&D, the 
point emphasized here is the internal reallocation required, away from big weapon 
systems, and towards the new programs; it remains to be seen how the total would be 
affected. 
 
The different nature of the new defense R&D may have profound implications for 
the industrial organization aspects of the sectors involved. The development of big 
weapon systems in the decades of the cold war lead to high concentration of both R&D 
and procurement into a few large corporations, conferring them a great deal of market 
and bargaining power. It is quite likely that this had detrimental effects in terms of costs 
and efficiency, and it may have steered technical advance into questionable directions 
(such as with the extremely expensive stealth technology). By contrast, the development 
of sensory computer interfaces, computer technologies for massive data analysis, Internet 
security, biological protection means, and the like, entails an entirely different playfield. 
These systems are by and large dual use, there is (also) a private market for many of the 
                                                 
35 See Cowan and Foray (1995), Lerner (1992), and Molas-Gallart (1997).   35
products sought, and there exist already a vast number of players in the high tech, 
computer and biotech sectors that can partake in this new R&D, as well as attracting new 
entrants. R&D programs designed so as to preserve this diversity and to encourage 
further competition may prove highly beneficial both for the required defense R&D and 
for the advanced sectors of the economy themselves, thus fostering economic growth.  
  
VII.  Concluding remarks 
  The foregoing analysis of the threats facing the USA in the wake of 9/11 suggests 
the articulation of a coherent defense R&D policy based on the following set of 
principles: 
•  In view of the nature of the threats facing the USA, it is no longer clear whether it 
is still justified to devote large amounts of R&D to the development of costly big 
weapon systems, such as new jet fighters, nuclear subs, carriers, etc. Gradual 
upgrades of existing systems, and basic research for future generations may 
suffice. The resources thus saved could be reallocated to the development of 
intelligence enhancing and anti-terrorist means. 
 
•  The war against terrorism involves two main aspects: fighting terrorists at their 
source (the S-strategy), and protecting potential targets (the L-strategy). The 
former is a preeminent public good and hence should be supplied by the 
government, whereas the latter is typically a private or a local public good that 
carries negative externalities, and is far less efficient that fighting terrorism at the 
source. A key result of the formal analysis is that the government should devote 
enough resources to the S-strategy so as to dissuade potential targets from 
spending on their own security. The different nature of each strategy dictates also 
the kind of R&D called for. 
 
•  Resources devoted to the S-strategy involve monitoring and intercepting terrorist 
cells around the world, disrupting their logistical and financial base, limiting their 
access and mobility so as to impair their ability to carry out attacks, etc. This 
involves first and foremost intelligence activities in their broadest sense,   36
suggesting that the most important goal of defense R&D should be to provide 
advanced technological means in order to enhance the intelligence capabilities of 
the various agencies in charge, and of the supporting military forces. 
 
•  Protecting potential targets is a mixed public-private good, and typically we can 
expect indeed that individual targets will have incentives to invest in their own 
(local) security. If so, private firms will also have incentives to conduct R&D 
aimed at developing (more effective) means of providing local security. However, 
that may not be enough for the usual reasons, and moreover, the conduct of the 
required basic R&D necessitates government support, as is the case in virtually all 
realms of science and technology. 
 
•  R&D aimed at protecting from non-conventional terrorists threats, and R&D for 
cyber security call also for an active government’s role, since both constitute 
“macro” threats and therefore the provision of security against them can be seen 
as a classic public good, with the usual implications. There is also room to 
encourage research in the behavioral and social sciences, aimed at understanding 
both the enemy and the effects of the terrorist threat on the targeted population.  
 
•  The provision of advanced means for intelligence and for target protection entails 
emulating human sensory perceptions through computerized sensory interfaces, 
and increasing the ability to analyze vast amounts of information. Both have 
direct civilian applications, and therefore the required R&D is mostly “dual use”. 
Indeed, and contrary to the high concentration of defense contractors during the 
cold war era, the development of sensory computer interfaces, data mining, and 
the like, entails an entirely different playfield: there is (also) a private market for 
these dual use systems, and there exist already a large number of players that can 
partake in the required R&D. New R&D programs designed to preserve this 
diversity and to encourage further competition, may prove beneficial both for the 
required defense R&D and for the economy at large.    37
References 
 
Arrow, Kenneth J., “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions,” 
in R. Nelson (ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity. Princeton University 
Press, 1962.  
 
Ayres, Ian and Steven Levitt, “Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable 
Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack.” Quarterly Journal of Economics,  
 February 1998; 113(1), pp. 43-77.  
 
Cowan, Robin and Dominique Foray, “Quandaries in the Economics of Dual 
Technologies and Spillovers from Military to Civilian Research and Development.” 
Research Policy, 24, 1995, pp. 851-868. 
 
Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler, “Terrorism: Theory and Applications”. In Hartley, K. 
and T. Sandler (eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics, Vol. 1. Elsevier Science B.V., 
1995.  
 
Gold, David, “Does Military R&D Generate International Public Goods?” United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, mimeo, January 1999.  
 
Griliches, Zvi, ed. R&D, Patents and Productivity. University of Chicago Press, 1984.  
 
Hoge, James F. and Gideon Rose (eds.), The War on Terror. New York, Council on 
Foreign Relations Press, 2002.  
 
Lerner, Joshua, “The Mobility of Corporate Scientists and Engineers between Civil and 
Defense Activities: Implications for Economic Competitiveness in the Post-Cold War 
Era.” Defense Economics, August 1992; 3(3), pp. 229-42. 
 
Lichtenberg, Frank, “Economics of Defense R&D,” in Hartley, K. and T. Sandler (eds.), 
Handbook of Defense Economics, Vol. 1, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1995. 
 
Molas-Gallart, Jordi, “Which way to go? Defense technology and the diversity of “dual-
use” technology transfer.” Research Policy, 26, October 1997, pp. 367-385.  
 
Mowery, David and Nathan Rosenberg, Technology and the Pursuit of Economic 
Growth. Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
 
SIPRI (2002), SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, disarmament and international 
security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 251, 309-322 
 
US Government, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of 
Defense Budget, Fiscal Year 2003. Washington D.C., February 2002 
(http://www.dod.gov/comptroller/fy2003budget/).  
   38
US Government, Executive Office of the President of the US, Office of Science and 
Technology Policy. FY 2003 R&D Budget Documents. Analytical Perspectives: R&D 
Chapter, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2003 
(http://www.ostp.gov/html/ap08.pdf) 
US Government, Executive Office of the President of the US, Office of Science and 
Technology Policy. FY 2003 R&D Budget Documents. Antiterrorism S&T 
(http://www.ostp.gov/html/AntiTerrorismS&T.pdf)   39
 
Appendix 1 
Defense R&D Expenditures – 1991-2000 
(billions of constant 1998 dollars) 
 USA  Germany France  United 
Kingdom 
  $  % GDP  $  % GDP  $  % GDP  $  % GDP 
1991 41.04  0.59  1.77  0.140  6.13  0.47  4.47 0.38 
1992 43.74  0.59  2.18  0.108  4.99  0.38  4.67 0.39 
1993 36.59  0.49  0.73  0.036  3.22  0.24  3.74 0.30 
1994 38.64  0.5  1.87  0.089  3.74  0.28  2.70 0.21 
1995 37.61  0.48  1.25  0.06  4.36  0.32  3.22 0.25 
1996 34.59  0.43  0.93  0.044  3.95  0.29  3.64 0.27 
1997 38.75  0.46  2.18  0.106  2.70  0.19  3.43 0.25 
1998 35.80  0.40  2.18  0.099  2.18  0.15  3.01 0.21 
1999 35.43  0.39  1.79  0.079  2.91  0.19  3.26 0.22 
2000 34.97  0.38  1.76  0.079  2.88  0.19  3.30 0.22 
 
 Japan  Russia 
  $ %  GDP  $ %  GDP 
1991 1.56 0.05  1.96 0.34 
1992 1.80 0.045  1.87 0.36 
1993 1.82 0.045  1.66 0.36 
1994 1.83 0.05  1.19 0.29 
1995 1.85 0.045  1.27 0.35 
1996 1.88 0.045  0.92 0.29 
1997 1.89 0.045  1.35 0.30 
1998 1.89 0.05  1.16 0.42 
1999 1.89 0.05  1.26 0.32 
2000 1.90 0.05  1.41 - 
 
Sources: 
G7 countries: Defense R&D computed from data taken from the National Science 
Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics (NFS/SRS), Appendix Table 5-41, 
and from SIPRI Yearbook 2002 (for total military expenditure). Japan: defense R&D 
expenditures estimated as comprising 5% of total military expenditure. For 1999-2000, 
all countries other than the USA: extrapolation based on mean (defense R&D/total 
military expenditures) ratio for 1996-98. Russia: total military expenditures: SIPRI 
(2002); defense R&D as % of defense budget: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of 
Korea (website: www.mnd.go.kr); GDP: World Bank and IFS. For 1992-93: 
extrapolation on the basis of the mean (defense R&D/total military expenditures) ratio for 
1994-96. For 1991: extrapolation based on mean (defense R&D/GDP) ratio for 1992-94.    40
Appendix 2 




Org Name  PE Name  Category 2003 budget 
Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization 
Ballistic Missile Defense Midcourse 
Defense Segment  D 3,195,104 
Air Force Budgtd by DoD  Joint Strike Fighter  EMD  B  1,743,668 
Navy Budgeted by DoD  Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) - EMD  B  1,727,500 
Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization 
Ballistic Missile Defense System 
Segment  D 1,065,982 
Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization 
Theater High-Altitude Area Defense 
System – TMD - EMD  D  932,171 
Army Budgeted by DoD  Comanche  B  914,932 
Air Force Budgtd by DoD 
Advanced EHF MILSATCOM 
(SPACE) BI  825,783 
Air Force Budgtd by DoD 
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) 
High EMD  I  814,927 
Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization 
Ballistic Missile Defense Boost 
Defense Segment  D 796,927 
Navy Budgeted by DoD  SC-21 Total Ship System Engineering  B  717,397 
Air Force Budgtd by DoD  F-22 EMD  B  627,266 
Defense Adv Research Projects Agcy Materials and Electronics Technology  M  440,500 
Defense Adv Research Projects Agcy
Computing Systems and 
Communications Technology  MI 424,940 
Navy Budgeted by DoD  V-22A  B  420,109 
Air Force Budgtd by DoD  Test and Evaluation Support  M  398,266 
National Security Agency  Information Systems Security Program I  394,257 
Navy Budgeted by DoD  Defense Research Sciences  M  393,557 
Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization  Ballistic Missile Defense Sensors  D  373,447 
Air Force Budgtd by DoD 
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System 
(Space and Control Segments)  BI  324,098 
 
Categories:  
•  B – Big weapon systems,  
•  I  – Intelligence 
•  T – Anti-Terrorism 
•  M – Miscellaneous 
•  D – Ballistic Missile Defense 
Two letters (such as “BI”) mean that the item is deemed related to both categories; in the 
calculation of expenditure shares per category, the expenditure is then split in half.  
                                                 
36 Ranked according to the 2003 budget allocations.    41
Appendix 3  
3.1 Proof of negative externalities 
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3.2  Second order conditions for  Max Ej: 
















































3.3   Existence of  X
* 
 
We have seen in IV.3 that the optimal government spending on the S-strategy is given by,  
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*  exists provided that for any  X<X
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That is, if the government spends nothing on  X  the probability of a strike is high enough 
to induce targets to spend on their own security, thus lowering  p  up to the point where 
equality is restored as in (14). If (A.1) does not hold then  x=0  regardless, and hence 
(9)’ becomes simply   W = n – p(X) L –X, leading to the FOC   α Lp(1-p)=1, i.e. the 
government will choose  X
*  such that  α Lp(X
*)[1-p(X
*)]=1. However, this case in 
rather uninteresting, in that we do observe private spending on local security even with 
X>0, and hence we can safely assume that (A.1) holds.    42
Appendix 4 
OSTP, FY 2003 R&D Budget Documents - ANTITERRORISM S&T 
 
The President is committed to leveraging the capabilities of our nation’s scientific and engineering 
communities in countering new threats to our homeland and our national security. The President’s 2003 
Budget represents an escalation in the Administration’s strong support for research and development aimed 
at defeating these dangers to our way of life. Research and development funding for homeland security and 
combating terrorism (including protecting critical infrastructure) will rise from nearly $1 billion in 2002 to 
an estimated $3 billion in 2003. These funds will be used to develop new or improved capabilities for 
protecting our nation from terrorism and its consequences. Some examples are provided below. 
 
Confronting Weapons of Mass Destruction 
The Office of Homeland Security has coordinated a major multi-agency research effort that will lead to 
improved techniques for timely detection of biological attacks on our nation, and for minimizing the 
consequences of an attack. In the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of 
Defense (DOD), funding for bioterrorism R&D is increased from a pre-9/11 level of just over $300 million 
to more than $2.4 billion—more than a factor of seven increase. $1.75 billion is provided to the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) to perform fundamental research leading to the development of rapid 
identification and monitoring technologies, diagnostic tests, new vaccines and therapeutics, including an 
improved anthrax vaccine. An additional $49 million would be provided to the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) for research and drug approval. Aside from a variety of other research activities, the 
DOD will dedicate $420 million to ensure rapid detection of biological agents, devise countermeasures, and 
to study and model the technology and tactics of bioterrorists. The Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) will receive $75 million to develop improved techniques and procedures for coping with biological 
and chemical incidents. Additionally, investments are being made to enhance the nation’s capability for 
detecting the use of chemical and radiological weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), for example, 
will demonstrate a multi-station prototype of a chemical agent detection and response system in the 
Washington, D.C. Metro system. 
 
Detecting Potential Danger 
A collaborative effort between the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and DOE will investigate the reliable identification of 
specific individuals, even when attempts have been made to alter appearance, by measuring the “biometric” 
signatures of people passing through, for example, airports. The effort will range from development of 




The Federal Aviation Administration, DOE, and the Technical Support Working Group (jointly sponsored 
by the State Department and DOD) will research improved methods for detecting conventional explosives 
in luggage, in airports and other transportation portals, at the borders, and in high population density areas. 
 
Setting Standards 
There will be a coordinated multi-agency effort for setting appropriate standards in homeland security; 
these agencies include NIST, EPA, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. Areas of focus will include setting standards for equipment used by first 




Fundamental investigative efforts will be funded at several agencies to provide basic scientific data for the 
war against terrorism. These efforts include $27 million for fundamental work at the National Science 
Foundation for sequencing the genomes of pathogens, so that more effective detection schemes and 
defenses might be developed, and work at NIH on developing candidate products that could become the 
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